In this article I will examine the powers and activities of NATO-led Kosovo forces (KFOR) 
Introduction
In June 1999, after a 78-day NATO military campaign over Yugoslavia, the United Nations established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
Under the vast authorities of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), UNMIK remains unprecedented in both its scope and its structural complexity (Murphy 2005: 9) . Unlike many other previous UN missions, UNMIK was formally divided into civilian and military components.
The international civil component was mandated "to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 1999: 10). The NATO-led Kosovo security forces, known as KFOR, were responsible for "carrying out military tasks" and "shouldering" UNMIK in civilian peace-building tasks (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 1999: 9). Initially, the establishment of an international security force in Kosovo was discussed during the NATO air campaign over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by the G8 foreign ministers (CNN 1999; Youngs et al. 1999: 61) The scope of KFOR authorities included "the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission" (Military Technical Agreement agreement will agree on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) through a bilateral agreement" (Military Technical Agreement 1999: Appendix B, sec. 3), the legal status of KFOR was regulated unilaterally. KFOR did not negotiate with the FRY on a SOFA because it wanted "politically to isolate the Belgrade regime" and "it did not want to conclude international agreements with the FRY which if concluded would have inhibited the competence of the UN-led civil mission" (Zwanenburg 2005: 46) Despite the changes to the political status of Kosovo, KFOR actions that have affected human rights still remain a debated issue. In the following sections, I will analyse KFOR command and control as a structural matter and its impact on KFOR performance in realizing its mandate as provided in UN SCR 1244. Then I will discuss certain actions undertaken by KFOR in accordance with its mandate and their human rights implications. The issue of attribution of wrongful conduct as it is defined by the International Law Commission (ILC) and application of international human rights standards to KFOR based on the concept of extraterritoriality will be analysed in order to identify a possible mechanism with jurisdiction over KFOR member states. Finally, I will discuss the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights on two applications brought by Kosovars against the nation states of troop contributing forces, Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway , and examine how all the mentioned issues have been considered by the Court. The paper will conclude with a recommendation for the necessity to establish a mechanism for remedying the human rights violations resulting from KFOR (in)actions.
Command and control of KFOR
Although UN SC Resolution 1244 was the legal base for its establishment, KFOR was not subject to the UN Secretary General or to UNMIK Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG). The cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR on the ground is very interrelated, but never reflected on the issue of command and control, UNMIK apparently "coordinates" with but does not control KFOR (Amnesty International 2004a: 9) . The first SRSG Bernard Kouchner presented the "relationship as the head of the UNMIK administration and the KFOR commander as being twin brothers" (Kouchner 2001) . KFOR specific command and control was described as a state that "does not amount to the required democratic control over the armed forces" and there were calls for UN SCR 1244 "to be interpreted in conformity with the essential requirement of democracy according to which the military is subject to civilian control" terms, command and control processes provide for "organization and management of daily operations to implement the given mandate" (Murphy 2005: 121-22 (Zwanenburg 2005 ).
On the ground, "the multinational command did not extend to the administrative control over contingents or to personnel management" (European Commission for Democracy through Law 2004). The administrative control was instead "regulated with the national laws and policies of each contingent, which differed widely from one state to the other" (Murphy 2007: 158-173) . This actual control is known as the "red card procedure", giving the contingents "the right not to take orders if such orders would contradict their national policy" (Cerone 2001: 486) or, as is the case with some forces (i.e. Canadian forces), where the national command cannot be handed over to a foreign commander at any time (Murphy 2005: 106-107 (Spillmann et. al. 2001: 148) . During waves of ethnic violence in Kosovo, "KFOR response to crowd and riot control operations was thus chaotic and the protection of the minority communities was catastrophic" (International Crisis Group 2004) . In general, crowd and riot control operations aim to suppress outbreaks of violence, in particular ethnically and religiously motivated violence, and thus ultimately aim to prevent upheavals from crossing the threshold into internal armed conflict. These operations play a particular role in the protection of designated people and the defence of property with designated special status (PDSS). In Kosovo, the designated people referred to minority communities like the Albanians or Serbs in a given area, and PDSS referred to their property and their cultural heritage. It has been stated that several times "KFOR failed to respond to the security problems in Kosovo and with it failed to protect minorities because of the lack of a unified command for all KFOR sectors in implementing KFOR unified policy on responding to public order situations" (Human Rights Watch 2004) .
KFOR activities in Kosovo and human rights implications
In the first years of administration, UNMIK and KFOR were faced with a volatile security situation that required a quick response. KFOR had to undertake policing activities over the entire territory of Kosovo until the international civilian police established capacities to take on full responsibilities. On the ground, KFOR had not only the role of civilian police, arresting and detaining ex-and would-be belligerents suspected of committing war crimes, murder, attempted murder, rape, weapon offences and other serious crimes, but also conducted so-called The principle of extraterritorial application of international human rights and its applicability to KFOR Scholars and practitioners have presented different modalities of the application of human rights and humanitarian law to KFOR. The most supportive modality remains the extraterritorial application of human rights standards to KFOR activities in Kosovo based on relevant states' extraterritorial conduct (Cerone 2001; Knoll 2006; Stahn 2001) . In international law, it is hard to identify a clear rule that provides for invoking the extraterritorial criteria. Also, there are no clear legal provisions for defining the state's human rights obligations when it acts abroad on its own initiative or as a peacekeeping force under the UN umbrella. In discussing the discomfort of the "powers of international technocrats", Hafner points out that "international organizations could be used by the states as a device to avoid responsibility and accountability by transferring the decision-making competencies to the organization and question the extent of international organizations being bound by the rule of law" (Hafner 2005: 36) .
The notion of 'applicability' of human rights standards over international military troops is to a certain extent codified and interpreted by international supervisory mechanisms. However, the issue of "effective implementation of the human rights standards and supervision by an international supervisory mechanism remains very incoherent in the absence of a coherent analytical framework" (Cerone 2006 ). All major human rights treaties to which NATO member states are parties require states not only to secure but also to establish mechanisms for human rights protection of individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction. The UN Human Rights Committee has consistently held that "a state's jurisdiction extends beyond territorial boundaries interpreting the scope of Article 2(1)" and that it "does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it" (Burgos/Delia and that his right to a fair trial had been violated (Article 6, para. 1 ECHR). In Behrami v. France, the applicant argued that the only authority in the region of Mitrovica mandated to secure the safety of the inhabitants, who were actually refugees returning after the 1999 conflict, were French troops. Despite notification by the local inhabitants about the existence of cluster bombs, the French KFOR took no steps to remove them; they did not notify the local inhabitants on the dangers of the cluster bombs, or fence off or mark the area (Behrami v. France 2007, para. 6 ).
Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay 1981). Also, in its General
In the case of Saramati v. France, German, and Norway, the applicant was one of many Kosovars detained on the order of the KFOR Commanders relationship between the Convention and the UN acting under Chapter VII of its Charter" (Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway 2007: para. 146 ). In doing so, the Court also considered the mandate and legality of the delegation of powers between the two international presences, UNMIK and KFOR. In analysing "whether the actions and inactions undertaken by KFOR can be attributed to troop contributing states", the European Court "decided by majority that those (in)actions derive from UN SR 1244 and with it are attributable to the UN and not to members states comprising KFOR" (ibid.: paras. 140-141).
UNMIK was authorized by the UNSC based on Chapter VII powers and it did delegate powers to the KFOR.
From here, the Court turned to determine the legality of the delegation of powers from UNMIK to KFOR. The Court analysed in detail the UNMIK chain of command based on its constituent documents and stated that "The UNSC was to retain ultimate authority and control over the security mission and it delegated to NATO, in consultation with non-NATO member states, the power to establish and maintain operational command of KFOR" (ibid.: para. 129). The Court maintained that "even though the troopcontributing nations had some authority over their troops (for reasons, inter alia, of safety, discipline and accountability) and certain obligations in their regard (for example, material provision), the SC retained ultimate authority and control and […] effective command of the relevant operation matters was retained by NATO" (ibid. 2007: paras. 138-140) . This Court's reasoning might sound convincing in light of the SC political decision establishing an UN-mandated security force for Kosovo as "an equal international presence" with UNMIK, but NATO-led and de facto NATO-commanded operations involved no strategic direction from any UN body. Moreover, the MTA that allowed KFOR establishment was signed before UN SCR 1244, and SC authorities over KFOR were only limited to the regular reports by the officials of the international presence to the UNSC.
In its further analyses of the responsibilities of UNMIK and KFOR, the Court found that "issuing detention orders fell within the security mandate of KFOR and that the supervision of de-mining fell within UNMIK's mandate" (ibid.: paras. 122-126) . In so doing, with respect to the Behrami case, the Court found that it was "KFOR's failure to secure the site [where the detonation had taken place] and provide information thereon to UNMIK" (ibid.: para. 126). Despite KFORs responsibility in relation to demining, KFOR was not acting independently in this task; KFOR undertook this task on behalf of UNMIK. As such, UNMIK was mandated with demining tasks and KFOR's inaction was attributable to the UN (ibid.: para. 163). The Court firmly stated that "given that UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the United Nations and that KFOR was exercising powers lawfully delegated under Chapter VII, their actions were directly attributable to the UN, an organization of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective" (ibid.: para. 151). The Court concluded that "in these circumstances, the applicants' complaints were incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and declared both applications inadmissible" (ibid.: para.152). 
Conclusion
The measures undertaken by KFOR to implement its mandate and authority as provided in UN SCR 1244 had adverse effects on nearly all of the rights guaranteed in international human rights law and applicable in Kosovo. NATO policy and state intervention in its troops' command and control caused an inconsistency in operations which resulted in a failure to protect human rights in Kosovo, in particular during KFOR operations to ensure security and quash interethnic violence. Infringement of individual rights through COMCFOR detention not only affected the individual's right to liberty and security of the person, but also affected the enjoyment of the right to a remedy and the right to compensation when the defendant was found not guilty. KFOR activities, due to its military strategy and operational level, were covered by broader immunities and privileges that practically rendered KFOR unaccountable for its actions. KFOR was not operating in a legal vacuum; however, the nonexistence of a specific legal framework that provided for the application of human rights standards to specific actions of KFOR made Kosovars consider the general principles of international law, mainly the extraterritorial application of human rights standards. However, the reasoning of the Court on the admissibility decision on Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway showed that the court relied on the formal hierarchy concerning the establishment of KFOR to escape an unfriendly precedent for future peacekeeping actions; otherwise, in the future, countries would hesitate to contribute their troops to international security operations. These two decisions showed again that peace-keeping is an essentially political institution and confirmed that Kosovars' right to an effective remedy was compromised when KFOR failed to protect human rights in Kosovo.
It is the standing of this paper that the conflicting issues related to the legal bases that establish the international peacekeeping structures and the internal operational rules of the troop-contributing forces need to be reconsidered. The legal bases for establishing future international security forces in international administrations need to allow for the establishment of a (non-)judicial mechanism as an integral part of the mission with the jurisdiction to handle human rights violations alleged by the inhabitants under their authority and provide for a reparation modality mechanism in order to respect the right to be compensated.
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